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We investigate executive turnovers  with focus on different kinds of outside board 
memberships of supervisory board members. The analysis is based on all management board 
members  of  the largest German  corporations  during the period from 1996 to 2008. Cox 
proportional hazard estimations suggest that companies send their executives to supervisory 
boards of other firms to actively monitor their capital stakes. External executives that do not 
represent capital stakes enhance only the monitoring intensity of the CEO. The total number 
of external supervisory board mandates of all shareholder representatives seems to enhance 
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Aufsichtsratsverflechtungen und Vorstandswechsel  
in deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 





Wir untersuchen das Ausscheiden von Vorstandsmitgliedern, insbesondere hinsichtlich ver-
schiedener Arten von weiteren Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmandaten der Aufsichtsratsmit-
glieder. Es werden alle Vorstandsmitglieder der größten deutschen Aktiengesellschaften im 
Zeitraum 1996 bis 2008 analysiert.  Schätzungen von proportionalen Hazard-Raten gemäß 
Cox legen nahe, dass Aktiengesellschaften ihre eigenen Vorstandsmitglieder in fremde Auf-
sichtsräte schicken, um ihre Kapitalanteile aktiv zu managen und zu überwachen. Externe 
Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat, die keine Kapitalanteile repräsentieren, erhöhen nur die 
Aufsicht über Vorstandsvorsitzende. Die Zahl weiterer externer Aufsichtsratsmandate aller 
Vertreter der Kapitalseite scheint die Corporate Governance zu verbessern, was auf einen 
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Director Interlocks and Executive Turnover 
in German Public Corporations 
A Hazard Analysis for the Period from 1996 to 2008 
 
1.  Introduction 
Personal linkages between large corporations via both executive committee and supervisory 
board mandates  as a feature of corporate governance have been subject to the academic, 
political and public debate since decades (for an overview see Adams et al. 2010, Bebchuk et 
al. 2009). The majority of this literature, which is regularly based on data from an Anglo-
Saxon institutional environment, assesses outside directorships as a sign of weak corporate 
governance. As a consequence of the ongoing debate, the recently updated German Corporate 
Governance Codex recommends a maximum of three supervisory board mandates. In fact, 
among experts and from the view of different stakeholders, opinions differ concerning the 
quality of outside board memberships as a measure of effective monitoring by supervisory 
board members. Compared to the existing literature for the UK or the United States, the 
German two-tier governance system still faces a great lack of resilient empirical studies that 
deal with the relationship between multiple board mandates and their effect on corporate 
governance quality. The present investigation contributes to close the existing research gap by 
analyzing executive turnovers in the largest German corporations for the period from 1996 to 
2008. 
Beginning with the end of the old millennium, the majority of representatives from banks and 
insurance companies on supervisory boards of non-financial firms retired in Germany (see 
Dittmann et al. 2010). However, multiple board mandates of executives and supervisors from 
non-financial companies are still present to a large extend. Furthermore, union representatives 
actually increased their number of parallel board seats. The reasons for those linkages and 
their impact on the supervision of management are still undiscovered.  
From a theoretical perspective two main approaches of the efficiency of corporate governance 
can be stated. On the one hand optimal contracting theory considers the existing corporate 
governance mechanisms as appropriate to minimize conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers due to opportunistic behavior of the latter (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1976). As a 
result, managers are presumed to maximize firm value. On the other hand one might argue 
that managers are able to defy control and use their discretion to maximize private benefits 
(cf. e.g. Bebchuk and Fried 2003, 2004). Observable features of corporate governance are   2 
then not the outcome of agency cost minimizing contracts rather than managerial power. 
Accordingly, multiple directorships could either reflect that particular successful and skilled 
managers are able to allocate their superior expertise to outside boards (cf. Fama and Jensen 
1983) or could be assessed as an indicator for insufficient monitoring that harms shareholders’ 
benefits. To differentiate between both approaches, we test different hypotheses concerning 
the effect of director linkages on executive turnover.  
Thereby we make two major contributions to the existing literature. By estimating hazard 
rates for all executive committee members we provide comprehensive evidence on executive 
turnover in a non-Anglo-Saxon institutional environment that goes far beyond the benchmark 
study of Kaplan (1994). Beside typical firm characteristics, supervisory board composition 
matters for corporate governance. In particular,  the number of external executives on the 
board and multiple supervisory board memberships seem to play a crucial role for executive 
monitoring.  Therefore  it is important to control for parallel equity representation  and  to 
differentiate between employee and shareholder representatives on the board. These are new 
aspects beyond Balsmeier et al. 2010, our previous study in German, which also had a smaller 
database with less firms and years and was without special attention to CEOs (meaning the 
chairmen of the executive committee).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework of the German 
corporate governance system and develops hypotheses based on a literature review. Section 3 
describes the construction of the panel, introduces the variables used in the study and provides 
some descriptive statistics. Section 4 gives a brief overview on the methodological approach. 
In section 5 we present the results of the empirical investigation. Section 6 concludes. 
2.   Institutional Framework and Literature Review 
A growing number of theoretical as well as empirical studies address the structural makeup 
and functioning of the  board of directors in the context of corporate governance (for an 
overview on the corporate governance discussion in general see Adams et al. 2010, Bebchuk 
et al. 2009, Heidrick & Struggles 2009, Hermalin 2005, Denis 2001, Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). As distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon one-tier board of directors the German stock 
corporation  act (Aktiengesetz)  prescribes a strict separation of  the  executive committee, 
responsible for the operative leadership of the company, and the supervisory board which 
appoints and monitors the members of the executive committee and decides on executive 
compensation. Under German law, reciprocal personal interlockings between two companies   3 
via executive committees and supervisory boards are prohibited. Executives are allowed to sit 
on up to ten external supervisory boards, while positions as the chairman of a supervisory 
board count double. An  executive  is not allowed to be simultaneously  a  member of  the 
supervisory board of the same firm.  
Another distinctive feature of the German corporate law is the co-determination of employee 
representatives on the supervisory board in large companies. Dependent on the number of 
employees, the co-determination reaches up to 50 percent of all board members. Employee 
representatives are composed of annually elected employees of the company and up to three 
external union representatives  (see  Petry 2010, Fauver and Fuerst 2006  and  Gorton and 
Schmid 2004 for a comprehensive summary of the co-determination regulations in Germany).  
Due to the strict separation of the executive committee and supervisory board in German 
corporations the position of the chairman of the former one is relatively weaker than the 
position of a CEO in a monistic board of directors. Consequently, it is not possible in German 
companies  that  CEOs  serve on the nominating committee and influence directly  the 
appointing process of new directors (cf.  Shivdasani and Yermack 1999  and  Zajac and 
Westphal 1996).  However,  information asymmetries are higher  in the two-tiered  board 
system, enhancing the discretion of a German CEO. In spite of the differences between the 
one-  and two-tiered board systems, the empirical findings for US-American  corporations 
provide  important  insights  for the evaluation of the efficiency  of control in German 
corporations. 
Independent of the precise form of the national corporate governance system, the key issue is 
in how far supervising directors may control the actions of potentially opportunistic managers 
adequately in the course of shareholder value maximization (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
It  is argued  that managers have an  individual  agenda of benefit maximization like high 
compensation and prestige, long tenure or the reduction of control that could conflict with the 
aims  of shareholders.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)  analyze formally the influence of 
incumbent CEOs on the board selection process. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the 
higher a manager’s influence, the greater is his ability to extract rents  from the firm. 
Indicators for highly entrenched boards could be for example limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments  or lower  sensitivities between performance and director compensation or 
dismissals (cf. Bebchuk et al. 2009 and Bebchuk and Cohen 2005). For empirical evidence for 
the entrenchment hypothesis in UK companies see Gregory-Smith et al. (2009).    4 
Multiple directorships could be interpreted as an indication  of  entrenchment,  helping 
managers to raise their  influence  and subsequently weakening  corporate  governance. As 
managers use outside board mandates to build and tighten relationships with other friendly 
board members at their home firm, they increase their bargaining power against the principal 
and reduce the risk of dismissal at the same time. Conversely, according to Fama and Jensen 
(1983), multiple board memberships could signal the outstanding competence and skills of a 
manager who is appointed to a larger number of boards. Above-average profits act as an 
indicator of the ability of the executive. Rosen (1981) and Biehler and Ortmann (1985) point 
to a limited and concentrated number of highly skilled and talented individuals who officiate a 
large number of board seats. Consequently, this approach suggests that multiple board 
memberships are an important instrument of corporate governance. Supporting this approach, 
Fich (2005), Ferris et al. (2003) and Brickley et al. (1999) find that CEOs of well performing 
companies are more likely to  be appointed to outside boards, while  CEOs  of financially 
distressed US-companies receive fewer outside board mandates (cf. Gilson 1990). Kaplan and 
Reishus (1990) provide evidence that it is less likely for top-managers to be appointed to 
outside boards if their home company reduces its dividend. The authors find no significant 
relationship between the retirement from outside mandates and the performance of the home 
firm. Fich (2005) indicates that the performance of a manager’s own firm proxies for his or 
her abilities. If outside directorships signal managerial talent, one might expect a positive 
influence on corporate performance of both sending and appointing firms.  
Conyon and Read (2006)  show in a theoretical model that outside  board mandates of 
managers are beneficial for the sending companies as shareholders benefit from the broadened 
knowledge and expertise of their agents. At the same time linked managers benefit personally 
from the supplementary business contacts through monetary and non-pecuniary gains like 
experience, extra salaries from the appointing firm or improved retirement options and higher 
prestige and therefore have incentives to accept further external supervisory mandates. In 
addition, multiple directorships could open new career options for a CEO if the appointing 
companies perform well and have larger growth opportunities that could be attributed to the 
incumbent director (cf. Yermack 2004 and Booth and Deli 1996). Fahlenbrach et al. (2010b) 
find empirical evidence that outside directors are more likely to leave a board and protect their 
reputation  if  they expect that  performance  will  decline or shareholder lawsuits are to be 
announced.    5 
A various number of empirical investigations deal with the effect of multiple directorships on 
corporate governance both for the sending and the appointing companies. Research interest 
focuses mainly on the structure of the board of directors and the impact on different corporate 
outcomes like performance or director compensation. Masulis and Mobbs (2009) find that the 
number of  outside directorships of inside board members is associated with increasing 
operating performance and higher market-to-book ratios. Perry and Peyer (2005) disclose that 
outside directorships increase firm value if agency costs are low. Companies with serious 
agency problems exhibit negative announcement returns if they send executives to external 
boards or appoint outside directors (see also Jiraporn et al. 2008). Consistent with the findings 
of Ferris et al. (2003), Fahlenbrach et al. (2010a) find no impact of CEOs on the appointing 
firm’s performance as long as no board interlocks are identified.  
A negative effect of multiple board seats could result if  supervisors are prevented from 
appropriate monitoring because of time constraints. According to the study of  Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), boards with a majority of outside board members who simultaneously 
serve on three or more boards are associated with weaker profitability and lower sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance.  They interpret this  as an indication of  inefficient 
monitoring.  Barnea and Guedj (2007)  show  that with better connected directors, CEO 
compensation rises, their compensation and turnover are less sensitive to performance, and 
CEO dismissals are more unlikely. Moreover, already connected directors are more likely to 
be appointed to other directorships. Similarly, Core et al. (1999) find for a sample of US-
companies a positive relation between CEO compensation and the number of board members 
who hold at least three outside board memberships. Balsmeier and Peters (2009) and Entorf et 
al. (2009) document a positive relation between average executive committee compensation 
and the number of external supervisory mandates of the executives on outside boards  in 
German companies. Dittmann et al. (2010) disclose a negative effect of the presence of bank 
representatives on the supervisory boards of German non-financial  companies  and 
performance. However, banks benefit from increased debt sales to firms in industries where 
they sent agents to the supervisory boards. It seems that banks gain extensive information and 
industry expertise through their outside board memberships. Evidence for the hypothesis that 
outside supervising board mandates can provide valuable information is also derived from 
Schonlau and Singh (2009). According to their analysis, firms that are linked via multiple 
board memberships undertake significantly more profitable company acquisitions than firms 
without personal linkages to the acquired companies.   6 
In summary, empirical investigations assessing the effects of multiple directorships are not 
conclusive. Some of the studies tend to conclude that director linkages are shareholder-
friendly, while other investigations report findings that support the entrenchment hypothesis. 
Studies addressing corporate performance and director remuneration suggest negative effects 
of multiple directorships.  
Kaplan (1994)  analyzed  empirically the turnover of executives  and supervisory board 
members of German corporations based on data of 42 corporations for the period from 1981 
to 1989. As a main finding he reports a positive relationship between turnover of executives 
and poor stock as well as earnings performance. The present study is also based on German 
data but uses a richer set of variables and firms for a more recent period of time. For the first 
time, detailed information on external board memberships of supervisory board members is 
analyzed in a non-Anglo-Saxon institutional environment. Thereby we add new insights to the 
literature on executive turnover as well as multiple directorships.    
3.  Data Compilation and Summary Statistics 
Our  panel  dataset  is  supplied by the German Monopolies Commission, a government 
consultancy in the field of competition economics. The Monopolies Commission releases for 
every even year a list of the 100 largest companies in Germany measured by domestic value 
added. The identified 100 companies count for about 18 percent of total domestic value added 
of all German companies (more than 3 trillion euros). Besides, the companies are substantial 
for the German network of company linkages via multiple directorships and reciprocal 
shareholdings (cf.  Monopolkommission  2010).  The Monopolies Commission’s  data  were 
manually filled up with firm data of the uneven years based on the sample of the previous 
year.  
Shareholder information is compiled from the Hoppenstedt “Konzernstrukturdatenbank” and 
the Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors” database. We used the Bureau van Dijk database 
“AMADEUS” to match accounting data where possible. Information on the members of the 
executive committees and supervisory boards were derived from annual company reports, the 
Hoppenstedt publication “Leitende Männer und Frauen der Wirtschaft” and additional press 
releases. Table 1 gives an overview of the used variables and the data sources. 
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Table 1  Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in the Study 
The table reports the variables used in the paper. Sources: Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, 
“AMADEUS” database of Bureau van Dijk,  Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors“,  Hoppenstedt “Leitende Männer und 
Frauen der Wirtschaft” and Hoppenstedt “Konzernstrukturdatenbank”.  
Variable  Description  Source 
Return on Investment   Return on investment (ROI)= (net income after 
taxes/total assets) · 100 
Bureau van Dijk 
Employees  Number of employees / 1,000  Bureau van Dijk 
PublicQuoted  Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is listed 
on a German stock exchange  
Bureau van Dijk 
Free Float  Fraction of widely held shares  Hoppenstedt 
CEO  Dummy variable which equals 1 if the respective 




EC Members  Number of executives on the executive committee  Annual Reports 
SB Members  Number of supervisors on the supervisory board  Annual Reports 
Age  Executive's age in years  Annual Reports, 
Press Releases 
Tenure  Executive's tenure in office in years  Annual Reports, 
Hoppenstedt, 
Press Releases 
CEO Turnover  Dummy variable which equals 1 if the incumbent 
chairman leaves the executive committee 
Annual Reports, 
Press Releases 
Executive Turnover  Dummy variable which equals 1 if an executive 
leaves the management board 
Annual Reports, 
Press Releases 
External Executives in the 
SB 
Cumulative outside executive committee positions 




...with Equity  Cumulative outside executive committee positions 
of the supervisory board members in companies that 




...without Equity  Cumulative outside executive committee positions 
of the supervisory board members in companies that 




External SB Mandates of 
SB Members 
Cumulative outside supervisory board positions of 




External SB Mandates of 
Shareholder 
Representatives 
Cumulative outside supervisory board positions of 





External SB Mandates of 
Employee Representatives 
Cumulative outside supervisory board positions of 
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We dropped all companies from the financial sector as well as companies that do not trade 
under the legal form of a stock corporation. Further, we excluded all companies that are 
subsidiaries of a foreign company as for these firms accounting data can be largely influenced 
by the parent company. The final panel dataset contains 86 companies with 596 firm-year 
observations. On the individual level we observe 781 executives yielding 3,280 person-year 
observations. Among these executives, we observe 489 executive committee exits during the 
sample period.  
Table 2 provides pooled descriptive statistics of the variables at the firm-level. As we will 
apply duration models, the empirical investigation is actually based on individual spells of the 
executives on the executive committee.  Hence, table 3  shows  summary statistics for the 
individual spells. The longer an individual spell lasts, the larger is the weight of the spell in 
the sample. The same effect applies for companies with larger executive committees  or 
companies with longer spells of their executives. However, the differences in the descriptive 
tables are relatively small. The tables show that in consequence of the correlation between 
firm and executive committee size, the weight of larger companies is higher on the individual 
level.  
Variables 
Before we focus on the main variables used in this study we briefly introduce the covariates to 
describe the sample. Return on Investment (ROI) is used as a measure of firm performance. It 
amounts on average to 3.5 percent in the 13-year-period covered. As only 67 percent of the 
companies in the sample are listed at a stock exchange, we are not able to use stock based 
performance measures like market to book value or Tobin’s Q without a considerable further 
loss of observations. It is important to note that the stock market in the continental European 
countries is small compared to an Anglo-Saxon environment. The number of Employees is 
used as a proxy for firm size. The average firm size amounts to 115,273 employees with a 
fairly wide range from 3,339 to 520,334. To reduce the skewness of the distribution we use 
the logarithm of Employees in the regression framework. With the fraction of widely held 
shares (Free Float) we control for possible weaker monitoring when the ownership structure 
is less concentrated. The amount of 42 percent free floating shares on average reflects the 
small stock market in Germany.  
   9 
Table 2  Summary Statistics on Company Level 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, 
“AMADEUS” database of Bureau van Dijk,  Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors“,  Hoppenstedt “Leitende Männer und 






Companies  Min  Mean  Max  Std. Dev. 
Return on Investment   596  86  -19.32  3.51  29.09  4.25 
Employees  596  86  3,339  91,131  520,334  106,566 
PublicQuoted  596  86  0  0.65  1  - 
Free Float  596  86  0  39.46  100  32.00 
CEO  596  86  0  0.21  1  - 
EC Members  596  86  1  6.39  26  3.39 
SB Members  596  86  3  17.66  22  3.58 
External Executives in the 
SB 
596  86  0  1.89  9  1.68 
…with Equity  596  86  0  0.64  8  1.16 
…without Equity  596  86  0  1.26  6  1.19 
External SB Mandates of 
SB Members 
596  86  0  10.40  47  8.99 
External SB Mandates of 
Shareholder 
Representatives 
596  86  0  9.66  43  8.49 
External SB Mandates of 
Employee Representatives 
596  86  0  0.74  6  1.06 
 
Out of all executives covered, 18 percent hold the position of the chairman of the executive 
committee (CEO). Including the chairman, the mean size of the executive committee (EC 
Members) is 8 executives, which is small compared to the average supervisory board size (SB 
Members) of 18 directors. This is not surprising as the German stock corporation act requires 
large companies in Germany to have supervisory boards with at least 12, 16 or 20 members, 
respectively, depending on the exact number of employees (> 500, > 2,000, > 10,000). The 
number of executive committee members is not mandatory. 
Executive age is on average 53.9 years and ranges from 30 to 75 years. The average age 
declined slightly from 54.5 to 53.2 years during the sample period. We do not observe a trend 
in the number of annual executive exits, which amount to 40.8 on average. As could be 
expected, the annual turnovers were lowest after the bust of the dotcom bubble in times of   10 
economic recovery. Executives in the sample leave their firms on average after 4.0 years at an 
average age of 56.0 years. 
 
Table 3  Summary Statistics on the Individual Level 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, 
“AMADEUS” database of Bureau van Dijk,  Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors“,  Hoppenstedt “Leitende Männer und 






Executives  Min  Mean  Max  Std. Dev. 
Return on Investment   3,280  781  -19.32  3.41  29.09  4.04 
Employees  3,280  781  3,339  115,273  520,334  126,517 
PublicQuoted  3,280  781  0  0.67  1  - 
Free Float  3,280  781  0  41.66  100  33.37 
CEO  3,280  781  0  0.18  1  - 
EC Members  3,280  781  1  7.69  26  4.24 
SB Members  3,280  781  3  17.78  22  3.48 
Age  3,280  781  30  53.49  75  6.30 
External Executives in 
the SB 
3,280  781  0  1.85  9  1.61 
…with Equity  3,280  781  0  0.57  8  1.05 
…without Equity  3,280  781  0  1.28  6  1.19 
External SB Mandates  of 
SB Members 
3,280  781  0  11.22  47  9.11 
External SB Mandates of 
Shareholder 
Representatives 
3,280  781  0  10.50  43  8.61 
External SB Mandates of 
Employee 
Representatives 
3,280  781  0  0.72  6  1.06   11 
Our main explanatory variables concern external board memberships of the supervisory board 
members. First of all we focus on supervisory board members that are simultaneously 
executives of another company out of the 100 largest (External Executives in the SB). Within 
this group of supervisory board members  we  evaluate  separately  the number of external 
executives on the board that represent voting blocks (External  Executives in the SB with 
Equity) and those external executives that are not sent to control equity interests (External 
Executives in the SB without Equity). Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of all kinds of outside 
board memberships  in the period from 1996 to 2008.  The  average number of  executive 
positions of supervisory board members almost halved from 2.8 mandates in 1996 to 1.5 
mandates in 2008. Figure 1 shows that the average number of external executives on the 
supervisory board who represent voting blocks fell from 1.0 director on the board in 1996 to 
0.3 directors in 2008. The number of outside executives on the board without parallel equity 
holdings amounts to 1.3 positions on average with a reduction from 1.8 to 1.1 during the 
sample period. In general we observe a downward trend from 1996 to 2002. Afterwards the 
level of external executives varied slightly around 0.35 (with equity) and 1 (without equity).  
A  declining  trend is also  observed for the average number of outside supervisory board 
positions of all supervisory board members (External SB Mandates of SB Members) that fell 
from 16.8 in 1996 to 7.2  in 2008. Figure 1  groups  the  trend of the number  of outside 
directorships held by shareholder representatives (External SB Mandates of Shareholder 
Representatives)  and employee representatives  (External SB Mandates of Employee 
Representatives) on the supervisory boards. When we differentiate between outside board 
memberships of shareholder and employee representatives on the supervisory board we see 
that the shareholder representatives account for most of the outside control mandates and 
determine the trend. The average number of outside supervisory board mandates of all 
shareholder representatives declined monotonously from 16 seats in 1996 to 6.3 seats in 2008. 
Although on a much lower level, employee representatives increased the number of their 
outside board positions in aggregate to 0.9 on average in 2008 after a temporarily decline to 
0.4 seats in 2002. Figure 2 shows histograms of the separate kinds of external directorships to 
have a closer view on the board membership distributions.  Almost 90 percent of  the 
supervisory boards in the sample employ at least one outside director. The cumulated number 
of outside mandates of shareholder representatives reaches up to 43 positions. Employee 
representatives are with 0.7 cumulated  outside positions on average significantly less 
connected to other boards.     12 
Figure 1  Average Number of Outside Board Mandates from 1996 to 2008 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, Hoppenstedt 
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Figure 2  Pooled Distribution of Outside Board Mandates 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, Hoppenstedt 









0 2 4 6 8 10








0 2 4 6 8 10










0 10 20 30 40 50








0 2 4 6 8 10
External SB Mandates of Employee Representatives
 
 
   14 
4.   Methodological Remarks 
To analyze the determinants for the duration of executive tenure and for their turnover we 
apply hazard rates  analyses.  In addition  to firm-specific covariates we include the above 
introduced network measures in the estimations to control for their effect on the individual 
duration of executive committee members or, more precisely, to analyze their influence on the 
probability of leaving the committee. Hazard analysis is a favorably method since our panel 
data exhibits a specific structure. In this section we present a brief discussion of the semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard model (see Cox 1972, for a comprehensive discussion of 
the method we refer to Balsmeier et al. 2010 and Hüppelshäuser et al. 2006). 
Let  T  denote  a  random variable describing the duration  of  executives  on  the  executive 
committee  and  t  denote the realization of the random variable  T.  The  distribution of the 
random variable follows a unknown function F(t). The survival function S(t):=1-F(t) denotes 
the probability of the duration in the executive committee exceeding t. The hazard rate λ(t) is 
defined as  
(1)   λ(t)=F’(t)/S(t). 
The hazard rate measures the probability that an executive exits the committee within the next 
marginal period of time  dt  conditional of being on  the board until period t.  Running 
regressions we can explain the observed hazard rate as a function of the covariates. Indeed, 
the structure of the data is characterized by a number of specific problems which prevent us 
from applying OLS-regressions. First, we do not know the distribution of the function F(t). 
Second, the data are in part both left and right censored since we do not observe entire spells 
for each individual executive in the panel. Therefore we apply the Cox proportional hazard 
framework, which allows us to consider censored data and to avoid dropping the respective 
censored observations.  
The semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model splits the hazard rate in an underlying 
baseline hazard λ0(t) which describes the general and a priori unknown process of the duration 
of executives and a vector of explanatory variables X of individual j. The hazard rate is 
multiplicatively proportional to the general baseline hazard and the specific covariates of an 
executive that may increase or reduce the baseline hazard. We obtain the parameter vector β 
using Maximum Likelihood. Based on this vector, we can analyze the effects of marginal 
changes in the covariates:   15 
(2)   λ(t, X)= λ0(t) e
(β X). 
A central assumption in the Cox modeling approach is that the effects of the explanatory 
variables remain constant over time.  To address this limitation, we have to test whether 
changes in the covariates proportionally change the hazard rate (cf. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 
2002). Further, the usual framework of the Cox model is restricted by assuming that the 
baseline hazard rate is constant for the duration of executive committee members in all firms. 
Given that companies could face different hazard rates, the Cox model is flexible to adopt 
different baseline hazard rates at the company level. This extension allows us to model firm-
specific effects that affect the observed hazard rate. As described above, the Cox approach is 
favorable to handle right-censored data (the end of a spell is unknown) and left-censored ones 
(the year of appointment to the executive committee  is unknown).  We suppose that the 
estimator for the parameter vector β should be unbiased since first, the panel has basically a 
random starting date and second, the length of the time period, which starts from the correct 
but unknown date of entry into the executive committee until observation, is random. 
5.   Empirical Findings 
In this  section we summarize estimations of different  Cox  proportional hazard  models 
estimating the effects of several covariates on the duration of executive tenure. In addition to 
the explanatory variables measuring the linkages of supervisors on the boards we include all 
controlling variables described in section 3. Since regressions with Return on Equity (ROE) 
yielded similar results, we restricted the reported findings to ROI. Including the number of 
executive committee and supervisory board members of the corporate group we control for 
potential board size effects (cf. Yermack 1996). We stratified the estimation by each company 
in the sample to control for time constant unobserved heterogeneity between firms. Therefore 
we allow for differing baseline hazard rates per firm. A likelihood-ratio test for the model 
specifications yielded significant results.  
Table 4 reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard estimations. The table shows the 
coefficients of the different covariates rather than hazard rates to avoid misinterpretation of 
the nonlinear effects. A coefficient  larger  zero  indicates an increased probability of exit 
compared to the baseline hazard rate while a coefficient less than zero indicates a decrease of 
the hazard rate.  
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Table 4  Estimations of the Effect of Multiple Directorships on Executive Turnover 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, 
“AMADEUS” database of Bureau van Dijk,  Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors“,  Hoppenstedt “Leitende Männer und 
Frauen der Wirtschaft” and  Hoppenstedt “Konzernstrukturdatenbank”.  All regressions use robust standard errors. 
Coefficients: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level. Z-statistics reported in parentheses. 
 
  Coefficient 
  (a)  (b)  (c) 
Return on Investment   -0.049***  -0.049***  -0.047** 
  (-2.74)  (-2.70)  (-2.52) 
Log Employees  -1.562***  -1.524***  -1.512*** 
  (-5.31)  (-5.18)  (-4.95) 
PublicQuoted  -1.174*  -0.781  -0.716 
  (-1.79)  (-1.45)  (-1.33) 
Free Float  -0.003  -0.009**  -0.008* 
  (-0.62)  (-1.97)  (-1.73) 
CEO  -0.368***  -0.383***  -0.377*** 
  (-3.53)  (-3.60)  (-3.60) 
EC Members  0.425***  0.388***  0.378*** 
  (8.75)  (8.52)  (8.25) 
SB Members  0.019  -0.087*  -0.076 
   (0.34)  (-1.76)  (-1.54) 
Log Age  -0.862**  -1.134***  -1.181*** 
   (-2.17)  (-2.89)  (-3.01) 
External Executives in the SB    0.172***   
    (3.04)   
…with Equity      0.296*** 
      (2.95) 
…without Equity      0.111 
       (1.54) 
External SB Mandates of SB Members    0.089***   
    (6.12)   
External SB Mandates of Shareholder 
Representatives 
    0.091*** 
(6.19) 
       
External SB Mandates of Employee 
Representatives 
    -0.096 
(-0.88) 
        
No. Spells  815  815  815 
No. Failures  489  489  489 
No. Observations  3,254  3,254  3,254 
Stratified (Company)       
Pseudo-R
2  0.074  0.102  0.104 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)  1,813.410  1,763.435  1,763.209 
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In specification (a) we estimate the effect of the firm-specific characteristics and executive 
age as an individual controlling variable, neglecting measures of director linkages. We find 
that  executives  in well performing companies have unsurprisingly  a significantly  lower 
probability of leaving the executive committee. An increase in ROI of one percent decreases 
the hazard rate by 4.8  percent. A higher  number of employees also lowers  the risk of 
executive turnover. If the number of employees rises by 1,000 the hazard rate is reduced by 
0.7 percent in the average company. Alternatively, we tested an inverse U-shaped function 
and found a turning point close to the maximum number of observed employees (~400,000), 
which basically confirms the concave function approximated by the logarithm of employees. 
All other explanatory variables do not vary to meaningful extent in terms of statistical 
significance and economic magnitude. To enhance comparability with the international 
literature and allow a direct interpretation of the estimated coefficient we present only those 
models with the logarithm of employees as a proxy for firm size. Further, we find no effect 
for the degree of widely held shares and a statistically weak effect of the dummy indicating 
whether  the company is listed on the stock exchange.  CEOs  are less likely to leave the 
executive committee. The hazard for a CEO is about 31 percent lower on average than that of 
regular  executives.  We find a significantly  positive effect of the number of  executive 
committee members on the individual risk of exit. With every additional executive on the 
committee, the fluctuation increases by 53 percent. We also find that older executives have a 
lower risk of leaving the committee. However, the effect is relatively weak with a decreased 
risk of 0.4 percent per annum. We tested alternative variables to measure the influence of age 
that yielded the same effect. A square term to model a U-shaped function of age led to a 
minimum value close to the maximum of observed age levels.  
In  specification (b) we include  variables  indicating  multiple directorships  of supervisory 
board members. In addition to the significant effect of performance, company and executive 
committee size and the CEO dummy, the share of free float becomes significant at the five 
percent level and reduces the risk of executive exits. A one percent increase of widely held 
shares reduces the fluctuation by 0.9 percent. The estimations show that both the number of 
outside  executive committee  and supervisory board mandates of the supervisory board 
members in the home company increase the hazard rate of an executive. The hazard ratio rises 
by 18.8 percent with a further outside executive and by 9.3 percent with an additional external 
supervisory mandate on the board. The results suggest that multiple directorships of 
supervisory board members have a positive effect on the control intensity of management.    18 
In model (c) we extend the estimation by including specific variables that control for possible 
effects  of  different stakeholder groups on  the  supervisory boards. In accordance with 
specifications (a) and (b), the effects of the firm-specific covariates and executive age on the 
risk for executives  to lose their position  remain qualitatively unchanged.  First,  we 
differentiate between block-based  voting  and mandates that do not represent equity.  The 
effect of outside executive positions of the members of the supervisory board on the hazard 
ratio remains significantly positive only if the respective executive’s home firm owns voting 
rights  of  the monitored company.  The finding strongly supports the equity monitoring 
hypothesis. An additional executive on the board who exercises voting rights of his home 
company increases the risk of management turnover by 34.4 percent.  Controlling for the 
effect of outside supervisory board mandates held by different stakeholder groups the 
estimation yields again differentiated results. We find that one further outside control mandate 
of shareholder representatives significantly increase the fluctuation of executives  by 9.5 
percent. In accordance with the findings of Balsmeier et al. (2010), we find that personnel 
interdependencies of employee representatives on the supervisory board do not significantly 
influence the risk of executive turnover.  
In accordance with international studies for US corporations we applied alternative measures 
of multiple directorships of supervisory board members. We calculated the fraction of outside 
executive and non-executive directors on the shareholder representatives and the fraction of 
outside directors on the employee representatives of a board to indicate the degree of board 
independence (cf. e.g. Fich and Shivdasani 2006). All model specifications for alternative 
network measures led to comparable results, such that we do not report them here. When 
comparing the specification based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which is a 
measure of the likelihood of the model when taking the number of parameters/covariates into 
account, it turns out that specification (c) has the best explanatory power. 
Since the chairmen of the executive committee  exhibit  in all model specifications a 
significantly lower risk of turnover, one might argue that CEOs face a different baseline 
hazard. Further, it could be possible that due to the unique and outstanding position of the 
CEO in the executive committee his monitoring is different from that of the other executives. 
Figure 3 illustrates the estimated hazard curves for both groups in the sample. It appears that 
chairmen face a lower risk of turnover up to tenure of 11 years. After this period, the hazard 
curve exceeds the respective curve of a regular executive.  
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Figure 3  Smoothed Hazard Curves by CEO Dummy 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, Hoppenstedt 
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To test  this assumption, we split the sample in the group of regular  executives  and  the 
chairmen of the executive committee and replicate the estimations reported in table 4 for both 
subsamples.  Again, we included  differing baseline hazard rates  for each company in the 
estimations for the subsample of regular executives to control for time constant unobserved 
heterogeneity between firms. For the subsample of chairmen of the executive committee we 
stratified on the industry level due to an inadequate number of observations. The results for 
regular executives remain predominantly the same (not reported here, we can send the results 
at request). For CEO turnover we find some interesting discrepancies. First, the influence of 
company size becomes insignificant. Surprisingly, chairmen of larger companies do not have 
a lower risk of losing their position. Second, the effect of age becomes insignificant, perhaps 
because CEOs are older on average. Third, we find that the number of executive committee 
positions held by supervisors has a significant positive effect on the hazard rate of chairmen 
only in the case of non-equity representing external executives on the board in specification 
(f). See table 5.   20 
Table 5  Cox Estimations for the Group of CEOs 
Source: Own calculations using data from the Monopolies Commission, annual company reports, press releases, 
“AMADEUS” database of Bureau van Dijk,  Hoppenstedt “Companies & Sectors“,  Hoppenstedt “Leitende Männer und 
Frauen der Wirtschaft” and  Hoppenstedt “Konzernstrukturdatenbank”.  All regressions use robust standard errors. 
Coefficients: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level. Z-statistics reported in parentheses. 
 
  Coefficient 
  (d)   (e)    (f)  
Return on Investment   -0.053**  -0.050**  -0.050* 
  (-2.17)  (-2.04)  (-1.84) 
Log Employees  -0.049  -0.138  -0.131 
  (-0.43)  (-1.12)  (-1.09) 
PublicQuoted  -0.356  -0.167  -0.204 
  (-1.23)  (-0.54)  (-0.62) 
Free Float  0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.15)  (-0.59)  (-0.57) 
EC Members  -0.008  0.001  0.002 
  (-0.24)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
SB Members  0.009  -0.004  0.008 
   (0.26)  (-0.12)  (0.21) 
Log Age  -0.176  -0.236  -0.338 
   (-0.17)  (-0.22)  (-0.32) 
External Executives in the SB    0.131** 
(2.03) 
 
…with Equity      0.101 
      (1.23) 
…without Equity      0.211** 
       (2.36) 
External SB Mandates of SB Members    0.018 
(0.93) 
 
External SB Mandates of Shareholder 
Representatives 
    0.033* 
(1.67) 
External SB Mandates of Employee 
Representatives 
    -0.295** 
(-2.33) 
        
No. Spells  153  153  153 
No. Failures  87  87  87 
No. Observations  742  742  742 
Stratified   Industry Level 
Pseudo-R
2  0.012  0.020  0.031 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)  596.000  595.228  592.906 
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Further, we find that multiple directorships of the supervisory board members as such do not 
have a statistically significant impact on CEO exit. However, when we distinguish between 
different shareholder groups in the supervisory board, we find that outside directorships of 
shareholder representatives in specification (f) significantly increase the hazard ratio of CEOs, 
while worker representatives significantly decrease this fluctuation. Multiple directors of the 
latter group are exclusively sent from sector wide unions and are therefore likely to act in the 
interest of them which may conflict with the interest of shareholders or even the particular 
firm.  The  inverse effect of both stakeholder groups points to this assumption. Powerful 
unionists on the supervisory board seem to mitigate the control intensity of the CEO and 
consequently protect his position in the executive committee for some other reward.   
As an additional robustness check we repeated the estimations for the subsample of chairmen 
without specifying a strata variable (not shown here, see supplementary tables). The 
estimations provided qualitatively the same results as the models using an industry stratum, 
whereas stratification at the company level is not expedient because of the low number of 
different CEOs in one and the same firm. 
Although we find if any only very weak evidence for different hazard rates of executives from 
publicly quoted and non-listed companies in our models it might still be the case that publicly 
quoted companies act different in terms of executive turnover behavior due specific disclosure 
requirements or enhanced monitoring by the capital market that are not fully captured by a 
dummy. As a final robustness check we rerun all presented regressions separately for the 
subsample of listed and  non-listed companies  therefore.  Concerning the multiple board 
membership variables again all results stayed qualitatively the same (not shown here, see 
supplementary tables).  Interestingly, higher firm performance as measured by return on 
investment has a significant negative effect on executive turnovers only in those companies 
that are publicly quoted.  
6.   Conclusions and Outlook 
In summary, the empirical results presented in the last section  suggest that multiple 
directorships are an important characteristic of the German corporate governance system. 
While linkages  of shareholder representatives seem to be an effective instrument for 
monitoring executives in Germany, outside directorships of employee representatives have a 
negative influence on the control intensity in the case of chairmen (or at least on their hazard 
rates).    22 
We argue that the empirical findings reflect the equity monitoring hypothesis as external 
executives on the board representing voting rights of their home company have a significant 
effect on the control intensity of the management. The motives  and possible benefits of 
external executives on the board that were not sent as a consequence of ownership control for 
the receiving companies cannot be answered in this framework. However, we find a positive 
influence of outside executives who do not represent voting-blocks on the hazard rate of 
chairmen.  Conversely, multiple directorships of employee representatives significantly 
decrease their fluctuation. Further, company size and age do not seem to be the dominant 
factors for CEO tenure and withdrawal. 
The results of the empirical investigation have to be interpreted carefully because we assumed 
identical baseline hazards for all turnover events. We controlled for the specific role of 
chairmen and found that multiple directorships as an instrument for effective monitoring in 
the framework of the German Corporate Governance Codex seem to have only a limited 
effect in the case of CEOs.  
Finally it has to be mentioned that it is likely that hazards and possibly the effect of the 
covariates vary depending on the reason of the exit event (cf. Gregory-Smith et al. 2009). Due 
to data restrictions, we are not able to test competing risk events in our framework.  
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